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To Ryan, love of mine

1

Let me put my cards on the table: Property is a universal and uniquely human
custom.
Initial reactions to the claim will differ. Cultural relativists will reflexively
cringe at the notion of property being a human universal. Their counterclaim
would be that property is a modern, Western European, hegemonic construction, the cause of wars and quarrels in the world. One of their patron
saints from the eighteenth century, Jean-Jacques Rousseau, imagined "what
miseries and horrors would the human race have been spared" had we not
"forg [otten] that the fruits of the earth belong to all and the earth to no one:, 1
In the nineteenth century, Pierre-Joseph Proudhon declared what many still
believe 180 years later: "Property is theft!" 2
Biologists will immediately search their mental databanks for a counterexample in the animal kingdom. There must be at least one other species besides
Homo sapiens-a primate for sure, or perhaps a dolphin or a squirrel-that
exhibits, at least on occasion, some behavioral patterns of property. They will
be quick to tell you that male baboons appear to own the females in their
harems; that red squirrels seem to treat the tree in the backyard as their property; and that rare delicacy of a Spanish mackerel sure looks like it belongs
to that bottlenose dolphin holding it with his mouth. Birds also defend their
claims on things against interlopers. Western scrub jays, for example, protect
their food caches from theft by rehiding them if a potential pilferer is in sight
for the initial caching. The biologists' own words to describe such behaviors
are own, property, and theft.
Legal centralists, which include most ordinary people and social scientists,
will at first take pause at, if not take issue with, the idea of property as mere
custom, for governments surely institute and enforce the rules of property. 3
How is custom going to return my stolen bicycle, you ask? Well, report it

1
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Jean-Jacques Rousseau (1754, p. 62).
Pierre-Joseph Proudhon (1840, p. 87).
Ordinary people and social scientists are largely exclusive categories.
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to the police and see what natJP<:ins. Nothing happens. And that nothing
happens does not help us explain why millions of bicycles go unstolen each
day.
you continue, don't the police and district attorneys spend more
time on the bigger stuff still covered by the local evening news, like department store heists and carjackings caught on surveillance video? Yes, but
that's beside the point Consider that relatively rare exceptions to the rules
of property cannot explain the ,.,,,,,,,..,_H,.,_,.~ with which people as a rule generally follow the
rules of property. How many people would never seriously consider-even if no one would ever know-taking a misplaced wallet
or claiming a rusty box with $52,000 worth of treasure buried in one's own
Staten Island backyard? 4 That nonenforcement is the nongovernmental institution in need of a nonlegal centralist explanation. Undeterred, you give it
one more shot: Such nonenforcement is the shadow of the law extending its
reach. Why then, I ask, does the shadow not work the same in all countries?
At its core, property is a custom whose practice differs, sometimes radically,
from place to place, even though the law's shadow is the same. Laws against
crossing the street against the light are the same in Berlin and Rome. Why no
same shadow?
Philosophers and lawyers wouldn't first reach for the word custom as their
substantive of choice. In philosophical and legal treatises, property rests on
rights, not custom. Rights, plural, are not as new as an abstract notion as are
property rights, but in terms of the human career, a multimillennial old idea
is still relatively new. Such a fact by itself doesn't preclude rights as an explanation of property in humans. New abstract concepts are useful, if not necessary, for explaining new phenomena. Quarks, for example, are a relatively
new notion in physics, and their indirect validation in experiments in the
1960s subsequently explained the composite particles discovered in cosmic
rays in the late 1940s. The old language of protons, neutrons, and electrons
was simply inadequate to explain new, more fundamental constituents of
matter. But if it is exceedingly difficult, as Auguste Comte put it, to work out
"new conceptions in the old language;' imagine how much more difficult it
is to work out old conceptions in the new language. 5 If the objective is to
explain the Rutherford model of the atom and how we came to understand
the atom as having a positively charged center orbited by negatively charged
electrons, the new lexicon of hadrons, baryons, and mesons, not to mention
4
5

Google it; it happened.
Quoted in Thomas Dixon (2008, p. 48).
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six flavors of quarks, would only bog us down. Even though the modern
Standard Model of particle physics explains phenomena unintelligible to
physicists a century ago, the Rutherford model does a fine job explaining
some practical problems about matter, like why dropping cesium into water
is an explosive proposition.
I lay my cards boldly, but hopefully not explosively, on the table because
I think it is important to draw the distinctions I wish to make as clearly as
I can. Depending on which department you visit at your favorite university,
you will hear some rather different perspectives on property. On one side of
campus, only some modern human beings have property, but on the other
side, all sorts of animals have property in food, mates, and territory. In the
buildings in between, home to the law school and the soft but not squishy social sciences, people entertain both views. Social scientists and legal scholars
will say that, based on everyday experience, it certainly looks like the family
dog has property when he guards his toy, and those same professors will tell
you that seventeenth-century Native Americans did not have notions of
property like their European conquerors had. As a midmost social scientist
and law professor myself, let me propose a sticky compromise: All humans
have property in things, and Homo sapiens is the only animal to have property in things.
As with most compromises, no one will be happy with this one. Current
thinking in biology is that the gap between humans and all other animals
is small. (Only human hubris makes humans exceptional in the animal
kingdom.) The thinking in humanities departments is that the number and
scope of human universals is so small that there are more important cultural
things to talk about and social problems to attend to. (Only humans pride
themselves on building the world as they imagine they can design it.) Social
scientists and legal scholars in the middle blame themselves for not designing
a better world (as only an exceptional animal can).
Part of the difficulty in talking about property is that the different disciplines talk past each other in their own languages with different assumptions
and different questions. To convince you my compromise has some credence, I need to provide you with a common framework for thinking about
property, a few open questions that frame the problem of explaining what
property is, and some hard-to-dispute facts that neither the humanities nor
the natural sciences-nor the social sciences in the middle unconsciously
channeling both colleges-are synthesizing into a meaningful explanation
of property.

6
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Property Is a Universal and Uniquely Human Custom
The cultural relativists have a point, but not the one they think. The evidence is clear to the midcentury anthropologist George Murdock: "so far as
the author's knowledge goes, [there is property] in every culture known to
history or ethnographf' 6 Nearly a half century later, in response to widespread denial of and his own doubts about human universals, Donald Brown
reiterates the claim that all human groups "have concepts of property, distinguishing what belongs-minimal though it may be-to the individual, or
group, from what belongs to others:' 7 But these few words are as far as they
each go in positing property as a human universal. Ralph Linton is a little
more concrete when he says that "all societies recognize personal property in
tools, utensils, ornaments, and so forth:' 8
Cultural relativists would challenge the bases for these claims. 9 Sure, all
human groups use tools, utensils, ornaments, and so forth, and it might appear to modern Western observers that such patterns of use are consistent
with modern Western patterns of uses for what we call property. But how do
we know that the Ewe in Africa or the Cree in North America or the Longgu
in the Solomon Islands think about property like Anglophones do? The word
property, relativists would claim, is an Anglo concept with roots in Middle
French and ancient Latin.
Perhaps, giving it the old college try, there is something in the definition of the word that would help us apply the concept universally. Consider
how the Collins Cobuild English Language Dictionary (for learners) defines
property: "Someone's property is all the things that belong to them or something that belongs to them:' 10 What does it mean for something to belong
to someone? "If something belongs to you, you own it:' So what does it
mean to own something? "If you own something, it is your property:' We're
back where we started with an Anglo concept, only now defined circularly
in terms of two Anglo-Germanic concepts. The word own is a particularly
problematic foundation for understanding property as a human universal. 11
George Murdock (1945, p. 124).
Donald Brown (1991, p. 140).
8
Ralph Linton (1952, p. 655).
9
See, for example, Duran Bell (1998) and Walter Neale (1998).
10
Available at http://www.collinsdictionary.com/ dictionary/ english-cobuild-learners. Last
accessed November 2, 2015. The Collins Dictionary is known for its definitions via the use of the
word in simple sentences.
11
Jeremy Waldron (1988, p. 29) also notes "many ambiguities in the term 'ownership'" in different
legal systems.
6

7

THE MEANING OF PROPERTY IN THINGS

7

According to the Oxford English Dictionary (OED), the transitive verb own
is newer than the adjective own and has been only in use since the sixteenth
century when it began supplanting the use of its relative owe in the sense "to
possess:' To escape such circularity in property terms, we are going to need
some semantically atomic concepts to explain the molecular or macromolecular concepts of property, own, and belong.
The cultural relativists are right then to be concerned ifwe Anglocentrically
interpret tool use by the Ewe, Cree, and Longgu in terms of belonging and
owning to assert that they have property like Anglophones have property.
Where the relativists go wrong is to leap to the conclusion that whatever is
semantically common to property, own, and belong cannot also be found in
every other human language. On the contrary, linguists have identified such
a semantic element, so primitive, so basic that two-year-olds parse it from
adult conversations and readily adopt it all on their own. That concept is
MINE. 12 But I anticipate.

If universally attributing Anglo-Germanic concepts to humans is fraught
with Anglocentricism, then attributing the same concepts to other members
of the animal kingdom is even more fraught with anthropocentrism, something about which biologists, and primatologists in particular, are reminded
every day. Unfortunately, as much as we would like to be more objective and
swap out our human-tinted lenses, we can't because we are humans and not
DNA changelings. There's no Archimedean point. We must make do with
our humanity when interpreting the basics of "property" in nonhumans. 13
Besides, identifying what humans have in common with the rest of the animal kingdom is useful, if for nothing else than to keep us humble.
To preserve our bodies and propagate our species, we must-like all
animals-satisfy our basic impulses to ingest, excrete, and avoid pain, heat,
and cold, and such preserving and propagating require physical matter external to ourselves. Whether the matter is some food, a potential mate, or
shelter from the elements, conflicts among conspecifics (the term in biology
12

Cliff Goddard and Anna Wierzbicka (2016). Small capitals indicate the concept and italics
the word.
13
See, for example, Sarah Brosnan (2011) and Joan Strassman and David Quellar (2014). A key
word search for "ownership" in the database for Animal Behaviour yields results for 356 different
papers.
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for members of the same species) are bound to occur when individuals simultaneously desire to satisfy the same impulse with the same rivalrous object. Not every species competes with conspecifics in the same way to satisfy
such universal impulses. Conflicts over external objects vary depending on
the ecological niche and the patterns by which individuals of the species
group together and move around relative to one another, the dwelling and
scheduling patterns of the species. 14 For example, yellow pine chipmunks
(Neotamias amoenus) in western North America and gray squirrels (Sciurus
carolinensis) in eastern North America scatter-hoard their supply of seeds
across their territory, but chipmunks in eastern North America (Tamias
striatus) and the American red squirrel ( Tamiasciurus hudsonicus) larderhoard their winter supply in a single spot. In the event of a conflict over a
cache, a single large one must be more aggressively defended than the border
of a scatter-hoarding territory.
But why are we (and all animals) not instantly combative with every conspecific with whom we are in immediate direct competition for an external
object? Because there are costs as well as benefits to any fight, and any species
that does not internalize these individualized costs will not remain a species
for very long. 15 As every species evolves, it stumbles upon the many behavioral margins for the conditions under which to fight or not with conspecific
competitors over food and mates. Bucks, for example, don't usually kill each
other when competing for mates in antler-clashing fights. Through very slow
feedback and innovation, species-wide patterns of actions form to govern
how individuals engage one another. The rules and order regarding the use
of external objects vary by species depending on its ecological niche and its
dwelling and scheduling patterns.
One problem with applying human rules to nonhumans is that such
concepts are derived from the distinctly human experience of the last
100,000 years. Doing so also leads us to conclude tacitly that there are but
minuscule differences between us and the rest of the animal kingdom, because the patterns of actions by which Homo sapiens satisfies its animalistic
impulses can look like those of other animals. Consider the red squirrel. The
biologist Brooker Klugh observes that, like humans, the red squirrel's

sense of ownership seems to be well developed. Both of the squirrels which
have made the maple in my garden their headquarters apparently regarded
this tree as their private property, and drove away other squirrels which
came into it. It is quite likely that in this case it was not the tree, but the
stores that were arranged about it, which they were defending. 16
So what do biologists' examples of nonhuman property have in common?
Whatever nonhuman property might be, the effect of it is that red squirrels,
male baboons, and scrub jays defend themselves against dispossession. If another animal attempts to acquire the thing in question, even if the animal is
not currently using it, it will aggressively bare its teeth and make some noise.
No parent has to teach its young to defend against dispossession. Such a response is inherited, and we can see why. Pushover progeny are less likely to
reproduce if they give up their food or mate without at least the appearance
of being willing to fight for it. Likewise, no human parents in any community
have to teach their child to resist attempts to take things securely within their
grasp. Children are natural-born possessors.
Possession, however, is only nine points of the law. The last tenth is important. Nine-tenths of the focus on property is on the effects of property.
Every nonhuman example of property from biology-squirrels, baboons,
dolphins, and scrub jays-is about the possession, exclusive use, and defense
of food, mates, or territory in nature. 17 Every human example of the absence
of property from the humanities and anthropology-think non-Western
European societies-is about the nonexclusive use of certain things by certain peoples. Biology compares like effects across species, and the humanities
and anthropologists compare unlike effects within a species. But it is when
we consider the last tenth, the origins of property in humans, and not simply
its like and unlike effects, that we can begin to trace what property is and how
it works.
Humans, like many birds and every other kind of mammal, have a home
range, an area over which they travel in search of food. 18 A home range typically contains a dwelling within it and its boundaries may be fixed or fluctuating. The subset of the home range, proper or not, that individuals will fight

16
14

C. F. Hockett (1973).

Economics 101 and Richard Dawkins (1976, ch. 5). Notice that the answer is not that we are
moral beings. Learning not to instantly fight is more the source than the result of our moral insights.
See F. A. Hayek (1988, p. 21).
15

9

A. Brooker Klugh (1927, p. 28). Notice the use of the terms ownership and private property.

In his sweeping and penetrating study on property, the historian Richard Pipes (2000) also links
universal acquisitiveness in nonhuman animals to the human institution of property. My claims on
property in no way detract from his argument that property is a prerequisite for freedom.
18 William Burt (1943).
17
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to defend against conspecifics is called, we all have heard, the territory of an
animal. 19 Territory is usually considered to be a form of property. As Klugh
notes, animals
to defend a territory, not for the sake of the territory itself, but for the food, mates, progeny, or shelter within it. Defending territory
is the proximate means for satisfying the ultimate impulses to use the objects
within it. Like squirrels, humans fight conspecifics to defend objects within
their territories. But we also fight for the sake of the territory itself. Moreover,
we do not interlope for the sake of not interloping, even if we could use the
items in a conspecific's territory. We do not interlope because we do not want
to think of ourselves as the kind of person who interlopes. We judge our own
motives and other people's motives to be good, fit, and proper. And that is not
a minuscule difference between us and the red squirrel. That discontinuity is
one crucial item in what makes us human. 20
The other important point to note in comparing red squirrels and humans
is that things like food and mates are logically anterior to territories for all animals, and so things are the focus here. Property in things is temporally and
cognitively prior to property in land. 21 Rather than starting with the more
difficult cases ofland, effluents, and riparian zones, I consider the uncontentious core for how we cognize property in things that gives the more contentious cases the significance they have.
As with territories, there is a gulf between humans and other animals in
how we regard the property of things as we go about satisfying our impulses.
The source of the gulf is symbolic thought. 22 Symbolic thought is what makes
many uniquely human capabilities possible: language, creativity and innovation, art, and trade; and symbolic thought is likewise what makes property a
uniquely human custom. 23

Ibid.
My thinking on this has evolved considerably since my early forays into property in Peter
DeSdoli and Bart Wilson (2011), but much less so from Erik Kimbrough, Vernon Smith, and Bart
Wilson (2010).
21 David Seipp (1994) contends from reading the Year Books that before 1490 English common
lawyers did not use the word property to refer to land.
22 Terrence Deacon (1998). For my purposes, it is sufficient to use symbolic thought and abstract
thought interchangeably.
23 Donald Brown (1991), Derek Bickerton (2009), Matt Ridley (2010), Denis Dutton (2010), and
Bart Wilson (2015).
19

20
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If there is a gulf that separates nonhumans from humans regarding property of things, it need not extend all the way from nonhuman patterns on
the one side to government-instituted and government-enforced property
on the human other side. Some birds, many mammals, most primates, and
all humans pass on patterns of actions to successive generations of progeny. 24
When the patterns of actions are not acquired from the genes of the parent
but handed down from teachers who were likewise habituated to the same
actions by their teachers, different social groups within a species will have
different patterns of actions because the learning of the practices is social
and not genetic. The brown-headed cowbird, a brood parasite, passes along
different courtship songs that cannot have been transmitted genetically; bottlenose dolphin cows pass along different foraging techniques to their calves;
and orangutans in certain locations manufacture and use tools to extract
food that orangutans in other locations do not make and use, despite living
in the same ecological conditions. 25 The common feature to all nonhuman
practices regarding food and mates is that the practice consists in learning
how to acquire something. Human beings, though, appear to be the only species to teach their progeny how not to acquire things. "No!" is how all parents
teach their children the rules of how to acquire-or not acquire-things in
the presence of other members of their species. Thou shalt not steal. Play
nice, Johnny.
All human groups use the logical concept of NOT; no linguist has ever
studied a language that does not contain the grammar to negate. 26 The other
side of the symbolic threshold is not simply the capability to negate how we
go about acquiring things to use. Our acts to acquire things are also judged,
for their own sakes, to be good or bad. Every language can express the
simple, indefinable-except-of-themselves concepts of GOOD and BAD. 27 In
other words, another discontinuity with nonhumans regarding things is that
human practices are moral practices. Thou shalt not steal. Tens of millennia
before there were governments, humans were teaching each other what not
to do regarding the use of things. No human child is born knowing the difference between the good and bad way to acquire things, and even though,

24
25

26
27

C. F. Hockett (1973).

Dorothy Fragaszy and Susan Perry (2008).
Donald Brown (1991) and Ann Wierzbicka (1996).
Cliff Goddard and Anna Wierzbicka (2002).
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as parents will attest, no human child must be taught the word mine, all must
be taught by their mentors to say, "That is yours;' and the customs of when
they can and cannot say, "This is mine:' Every generation of children must
be taught the difference between the good and bad ways to acquire things in
their community.
Even if a pair of Hello Kitty mittens hanging on a wall hook is identical to a
pair lying on the floor, a child distinguishes between the two in such a way as
to grab the pair that is "Mine!;' regardless of which pair is the closest to them.
Property is not the effect of leaving the closer pair of mittens on the floor.
Property is not the effect of exclusively using the second pair of mittens on the
hook. Property is not resisting the dispossession of the mittens within one's
grasp. Property is in the original perception that the two pairs of mittens are
distinctly different things in the mind's eye. Property is knowing from experience that one pair of mittens is "mine" and the other is, respectfully, "yours:'
Our human minds perceive the world of people and things through a
socially transmitted custom of knowing when to say, "This thing is mine;'
and reciprocally, «That thing is yours:' Property is a custom. Property is a
custom because it is a practice socially taught and socially learned. Property
is a custom because it is a moral practice. And property is a human custom
because it is a scheduling pattern of the species. Property resides in our
environment-well, partly.
The other part of property, of course, is in our genes. In every human language someone can say, "This (thing) is mine:' Every human community
distinguishes things that belong to the individual from things that belong
to others. Not every human community has property in land, but all human
groups have property in tools, utensils, or ornaments. I did say "all:' However
minimal it may be, there are some things about which only a particular individual can say, "This is mine:' Not all spears or ceremonial ornaments are
the same. Like lacrosse sticks and Hello Kitty mittens, the custom is such that
there is but one individual who can wield or wear it.
If every human community recognizes property in tools, utensils, and
ornaments, and if someone in every human community can say, "This is
mine!" about something, then it would appear that property is a human universal. And if property involves not taking certain things because they are
((yours;' and humans are the only species that learns from mentors how not
to acquire things, then it would appear that Homo sapiens is the only animal
to have property in things. A core question is how humans comprehend the
meaning of property as a custom regarding things. One consequence of this

13

project is that it dispels the modernocentric myth that "governments must

grant rights before it can enforce them:' 28 If we think of property as a custom
a hundred or so millennia in the making, then I think a judge can adjudicate
a concrete conflict regarding the content of the custom without a legislature
positively granting anything.

If property is a custom about as old as our species itself, then reading
into the word the concept of rights to describe property might give us some
pause for anachronistic concern. I understand what philosophers, lawyers,
and philosopher-lawyers mean when they say, for example, that property is
((the right to determine how a particular thing will be used;' or ((the right to
exclude others from a valued resource;' or "a right to a thing:' 29 I also understand what X means, where X is a thing, excluding others from a valued
resource, and determining how particular things will be used. But what is not
immediately clear to me is the meaning of "the right to' in ('the right to X:'
One meaning might be "the freedom to;' as in property is the freedom to
determine how a thing will be used. In the discriminating language of the
early twentieth-century American jurist Wesley Hohfeld, such a species of
right is a privilege, or a liberty, for someone to do something with the thing,
meaning, formally, that someone has no duty not to do something with the
thing. 30 But something is lost in equating a right to use a thing with both
a double negative duty and a freedom or liberty or privilege to use a thing.
A right connotes something more than being allowed, but having no duty
not, to use a thing.
Leif Weinar in the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy defines rights
as "entitlements (not) to perform certain actions, or (not) to be in certain
states; or entitlements that others (not) perform certain actions or (not) be
in certain states:' 31 Similarly, when the philosophers Douglas Rasmussen
and Douglas Den Uyl refer to a right, they say it is "a claim or entitlement
that individuals have for how others will treat them?' 32 All right, what is a

28

Itai Sened (1997, p. 6).
Respectively, J.E. Penner (1997, p. 5), Thomas Merrill (1998, p. 730), and Henry Smith (2012,
p. 1691). See also David Schmidtz (2012).
30 WesleyHohfeld (1919).
31 LeifWeinar (2015).
32 Douglas Rasmussen and Douglas Den Uyl (2005, p. 77).
29
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daim or an entitlement? Dictionaries like the Collins Cobuild are dizzyingly
unhelpful:
• "A claim is a demand for something that you think you have a right to:'
• «If you have a right to do or to have something, you are morally or legally
entitled to do it or have it:'
• "If you are entitled to something, you have the right to have it or do it:'
Yet there must be more to the meaning of right and entitle for Sir Edward
Coke to say that "every right is a title, but every title is not such a right for
which an action lieth:' 33 Another clue: The first ten amendments to the
U.S. Constitution are not called the Bill of Entitlements. Defining rights via
entitlements appears to strip rights of some of their moral force. To escape
such a circularity we need some semantically atomic concepts to distinguish
the concept of entitlements from the molecular, if not cellular, concept of
rights.
Jeremy Waldron says that "the idea [of rights is J that people have certain
key interests ... which they are not to be required to sacrifice, and which
therefore may not be overridden, for the sake of the collective welfare or
other goals of their societY:' 34 J. E. Penner's definition contains somewhat
simpler constituent concepts: "an interest of sufficient importance to the
person who has it to serve as an exclusionary reason guiding the action of
35
others:' Both of these are illuminating explanations but also, it should be
noted, postaristocratic, bourgeois notions of the rights of individual persons, hoi polloi included. 36 What is the core of property in humans before the
Western European world embourgeoisified it with the liberty, dignity, and
equality of rights?
According to the OED, the history of right as that which is considered consonant with aristocratic justice is much older (and cognate with Old Frisian,
Old Dutch, Old Saxon, and Old High German and comparable to Old
Icelandic, Old Swedish, and Old Danish) than the word right in having the
right to do X. The right to do Xis decidedly post-Norman invasion Middle
English, which means it does not necessarily include the masses.

33
34

35
36

Sir Edward Coke (1628, r. 345 b).
Jeremy Waldron (1988, p. 13).
J.E.Penner(l997,pp.13-14).
Deirdre Mccloskey (2010, 2016).
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The linguist Anna Wierzbicka suggests that since the Enlightenment "it is
likely that the semantic equivalents of rights in languages other than English
(e.g., les droits in French, prava in Russian) do not have the same passionate
moral connotations as the English word rights, associated by the speakers
of English with 'what is the right thing to do: "37 The point of this is to say
simply that the concepts of entitlement and the right to do X, and the reasons
that our species has them, are too modern, too complex, and possibly too
Anglo to serve as our species' mass modest foundation for the emergence
of property on the Pleistocene savanna. Moreover, it matters for how social
scientists theorize, philosophers philosophize, and judges opinionize about
property in the twenty-first century that we comprehend its meaning in a
way that is consistent with how our species acquires and cognizes, by which
I mean perceives and knows, the custom.

Humans Locate the Meaning of Property within a Thing
To ordinary people, property is a dull subject. Big deal, people own stuff.
Probably too much stuff, if you ask Thorsten Veblen, John Kenneth Galbraith,
or Bernie Sanders. My claim is that property in stuff, whether in too much stuff
or not, is extraordinary and uncommon in the animal kingdom. I want to persuade you that biologists and human unexceptionalists are wrong about Homo
sapiens and property. Once you have become more acquainted with how it
works, you will see that property is both evolutionarily new and singular, like
human language, creativity, and cumulative culture are new and singular in the
natural history of the planet. Property works like language works, with symbolic reference. But more than being uniquely human, I wish to show you the
marvels of how we perceive and know the custom of property. The evidence is
varied and unexpected to be sure, but it is evidence nonetheless, even ifyou see
the signs of property often, but least of all, in the places I show you.
Our minds have become accustomed, at least since the Enlightenment, to
drawing a thick dividing line between our physical body and the environment surrounding it, an impassable border delimiting the 'T in my body
and the people and things outside of it. In claiming that property is a human
universal I am saying that the long, twentieth-century conflict between genes
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the environment is as false when it comes to property as in any naturenurture debate in both the hard and plastic sciences. 38 Property as part of
our common
means that we can admire the peace and harmony it
and can appreciate the beautiful human things that become possible
when property jointly and reciprocally links the minds of individuals to one
anc>tnt!r, minds of people who do not personally even know each other. I will
make the case that the iu....u,. .....u. propensity to orderly conduct ourselves with
regard to things is necessary for bettering the social and economic condition
of the human race. No other animal has ever extended its own average life expectancy, decreased its own rate of infant mortality, and actualized healthier
and more comfortable lives for itself. But Homo sapiens burgensis has, and
property makes those remarkable feats of nature possible.
You need to be careful here. Not all human conduct done in the name
of "Mine!" is beautiful and great, worthy of wonder and admiration. To
put it mildly. If you look at the cruel, dark moments of human history, including slavery, colonialism, and violence, more generally, you are going
to find people wanting things and doing all sorts of evil things to claim
other people's things as their own. I am not claiming that the universal and
uniquely human custom of property is absolutely good so that any one of a
number of counterexamples of specific rules of property obviously refutes
my thesis. To the contrary, the custom of property is not absolute and certainly not absolutely good. Sometimes the bad things that happen are simply
the result of human fallibility, of human beings failing in our humanity. And
sometimes the bad things that humans do become, when done regularly, a
bad customary rule of property. To be able to distinguish a particular bad
customary rule of property from a particular instance of someone doing bad
things, we must first be able to recognize what it means for property to be a
custom, which means seeing the orderly patterns of property in human intercourse. One methodological aim of the book is to establish that property
is indeed a custom. It is beyond the scope of the book, in light of such a fact,
to evaluate particular rules of property as good or bad, just or unjust, fair or
unfair, equitable or inequitable, reasonable or unreasonable, partial or impartial, xenophilic or xenophobic, androcentric or (the purely hypothetical)
gynocentric.
U,--•u~-~u~
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No single custom stands above all other customs. Property is one of the
many customs that humans practice. By embedding property as one piece
in the whole of human conduct that regulates our communities, we submit
property to the same standards that we submit all customs to. Property, like
all other customs, must fit in with the entire scheduling pattern of the community. One benefit of treating property as a custom is that we avoid reifying
property as a right, which inevitably puts it into conflict with some other
reified right, with the false choice being that one thingy right must trump and
displace the other thingy right. 39 Customs of magnanimity or charity might
trump the custom of property. Or they might not. If property is about what
humans do, about how we orderly conduct ourselves with regard to things,
then what we humans do with respect to property is not an either-or proposition. It's a matter of how property fits in with our regularized interactions.
::,,0-

We have traversed some extensive terrain in this opening chapter. If I am
guilty of prolixity, it is because I wish to pique the interest of readers from
several disparate disciplines about the problem of explaining what property
is and why our species happens to have it. There are many open questions
in economics, philosophy, and legal scholarship concerning how property
works today, and the origins of property in our species might be relevant to
understanding them. 40 I aim to show how we might begin answering some
such questions.
At the center of property is an individual organism that perceives the
physical world through its body. The organism uses its body to see, hear,
touch, smell, and taste the world. Seeing, hearing, and touching figure prominently in property. Smelling and tasting, not so much. While the hardware
of the brain receives the neurophysical impulses sent from the eyes, ears,
and skin, the software of the mind classifies and organizes the impulses as
sensations and, according to its schedule, returns as output an instruction to
act. The primeval sensations at the heart of property are the harm or injury
an organism feels, and the concomitant resentment, when it perceives that a
conspecific has severed its connection with an object. Resentment in many
39 The subsidiary assumption, a law of the physical universe, is that two objects cannot occupy the
same space at the same time.
40 Jeffery Stake (2004) discusses how animal behaviors resemble property in humans but not how
the custom emerged in our species.
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schedules calls for the organism to defend itself by beating back the
with some
in return. Such is the micro-foundation of property.
Unlike 80 to 90 percent of all mammals, humans aren't solitary creatures. 41
We duster beyond mating and raising our young. We live and move and
think in a social setting, a community. Our minds do not solipsistically
classify and organize our neurophysical impulses. An individual's expectations about what others will do are embedded in the expectations of the
other members of the community. The individual's schedule to act shapes
the scheduling pattern of the community, and the scheduling pattern of the
community shapes the individual's schedule to act. Because injury and resentment at the micro-level can spread like wildfire from individual to individual, quarrels about the connections between people and things run the
risk of destroying a community. Third parties with some distance can temper
the flames of contention by spelling out for the entire community what the
expectations of the disputants should have been regarding individuals and
things. Such articulations, arising both from an individual's schedule to act
and from the existing customs of the community, simultaneously inform and
are informed by the scheduling pattern of the community. At the same time,
the articulations update the schedules of people not involved in the dispute.
Such is the meso-foundation of the property.
For at least 90 percent of the human career, we lived in small roving bands or
tribes of a few hundred people. Then beginning with Jericho and <;atalhoyiik
some 10,000 years ago, we increasingly began to live in sedentary towns of
several thousand people, followed by polities of tens of thousands, hundreds of thousands, millions, tens of millions, hundreds of millions, and now
billions of people. 42 In virtue ethical terms, if the micro-level of property is
about justice for the individual and the meso-level about temperance from the
community regarding justice for the individual, the macro-level is about prudence, the society-wide promotion of economic betterment. The competing
institutions that emerge to unite the day-to-day interactions of strangers from
different communities are the ones that are comparatively less costly. 43
Social scientists and legal scholars predominantly think about property at
the macro-level and in terms of the modern democratic concept of rights.
They pose the fundamental question as, what property rights should the government grant or rescind to support the everyday interactions of its citizens?
<11u1.u.a1..:,
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Or, what property rights facilitate economic betterment? Such questions
frame property rights as being up for grabs and, hence, a source of conflict
that pits the majority of the moment against the minority. As the economist
Terry Anderson put it to me, might makes rights. A macro-level focus on
property rights glosses over the micro- and meso-foundations of property
that undergird peace and civil society writ
Whereas the custom of
property is ancient, moral, and universal to all people, property rights are
modern, amoral, and majoritarian. Property unites communities and makes
civil society, the open society, the great society, possible. The justice and temperance of mine and thine are necessary conditions for prosperity and human
flourishing.

The argument of the book proceeds by integrating nearly every word of
this chapter's title into it. Claim and title go hand in hand. Getting to the
meaning in a title will take a little time, for it relies on first establishing the
universality and uniqueness of the custom in humans.
All animals use things, specifically food, but food is unlikely to be the original object of property in humans. Tools have the potential to be the original
objects of property because of how we make and use them. Many nonhuman
animals use tools, but there is a gulf between their uses of tools and ours.
Symbolic or abstract thought makes meaning possible, and meaning makes
composite tools possible. I contend that symbolic thought explains such a
discontinuity with the rest of the animal kingdom.
The custom of property emerges out of the social practice of tool use in
primates when symbolic thought is applied to it. Primates socially transmit
tool practices, but humans share meaning-laden customs. The thingness of
property as a custom comes from tools. Tool use is embodied knowledge,
and property embodies the claim, «This is mine!" Humans socially transmit
property with moral force and jointly shared expectations.
What is the relationship between what is right in a moral claim of "This is
mine" and the particular rules that make up the custom of property? What is
right regarding things is not derived from the rules of property, but a rule of
property arises from our background knowledge of what is right regarding
people and things. The spontaneous conversations of participants in two different economic experiments illustrate such a distinction, beginning with
what I mean by «what is right:' Resentment prompts people to act when other
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.~Wletake things that I claim are mine, and property is the moral scheduling
pattern that emerges to protect members of a community from real and pos-

itive injury.
The class of words most likely to be overlooked in a title is the preposition.
(They're so small we don't even bother to capitalize them.) My working supposition is that language, including the inversely proportional work of the
little word in, reflects and reveals the unconscious principles of the mind. 44
As Wierzbicka says, «looking into the meaning of a single word, let alone a
single sentence, can give one the same feeling of dizziness that can come from
thinking about the distances between galaxies or about the impenetrable
empty spaces hidden in a single atom:' 45 I posit that an English-language
convention arose, and now has largely fallen out of use, for dealing with
the formidable, yet beautiful, complexity of the meaning of property. The
burden of my argument is to show that while this convention lasted for only
500 years, less than 1 percent of the time our modern species has roamed
the planet, it provides an insight into how humans universally and uniquely
cognize property. And my argument is this: Humans locate the meaning of
property within a thing. Property is contained within the thing.
My claims on property reinforce and tie together several legal philosophies of property including Neo-Lockean, Kantian a priorism, exclusive use,
and in rem. The language of "possession" and "rights" muddies the meaning
of property and the conception of possession discards mind and custom. The
British lawyer and jurist A. M. Honore would seem to agree with my claims
on property. The Neo-Lockean theory of property invokes custom but doesn't
go far enough. Kantian a priorism cannot account for the moral significance
and transmission of property, and exclusive use cannot explain property as
a scheduling pattern in humans. The in rem theory of property has the right
idea by returning to the thingness of property, but it is a macro-theory of
property rights, not an account of how property works at the micro- and
meso-foundations of human sociality.
Several prominent court cases explicate how we cognize property, out of
which a clear rule emerges. The custom for created goods is first-in-hand, especially if the thing is your creation, but also if the thing is in the common
state placed by nature. The custom may evolve to first-to-work- upon if, as the
property law scholar Robert Ellickson clearly explains, the costs are high. 46
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Firstness, however, doesn't matter if location priorly matters. Out of the discussion emerges a testable implication of the theory. If you have property in
y and X is in Y, you have property in X in Y. The rule is that simple, and a
difficult case indicates how to test the rule. Using my first first-person threedimensional virtual world experiment, I report a test of the theory. The results
of the test are robustly agreeable to the prediction with an unexpected but
consistent-with-the-prediction proviso.
One implication of the theory for economics is that the language of "property rights" contains a tacit assumption about how economists think they
work. Property rights are the expectations defined by property, not the content of property. In other words, property effects property rights. The microand meso-foundations of property make the macro-level of property rights
possible. Such a view challenges the felicitousness of the bundle-of-sticks
metaphor, which inverts how humans cognize property. It also means legal
realists are wrong on the facts to claim that there is no prior normative conception of property.
A second implication is that property, not property rights, is a fundamental principle of economics. The rules of property are not mere external
constraints imposed upon an individual, as we are wont to think. Property
resides in a bidirectional relationship that extends to and from the minds of
individuals and the moral scheduling pattern of their community.

